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This thesis examines small (under $100,000) maintenance
service contracts as they are written awarded, and admin-
istered under Naval Facilities Engineering Command contract
authority. Various significant pre-award decisions are
discussed as they impact on contractor performance. The
commonly used post-award enforcement techniques are des-
cribed and evaluated for effectiveness in assuring contractor
performance. The contractor selection techniques are
examined. Recommendations for improving contractor perfor-
mance incentives through pre-award provisions, alternate
methods of contractor selection, and strengthening post-
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This thesis is directed towards maintenance service
contracts as they have been administered by the Naval
Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) organization of
Resident Officers in Charge of Construction (ROICC's) and
Officers in Charge of Construction (OICC's).
A. DEFINITION AND SCOPE
A service contract is one which calls directly for a
contractor's time and effort rather than a concrete end
product. It requires a contractor to do something rather
than make something.
Services may be considered to be either personal or
nonpersonal. Personal service contracts would be those
where employees receive assignments from Government per-
sonnel and work under direct supervision of the Government.
American Federation of Government Employees, local 1858
v. Administrator, NASA, USDC D.C., 8/12/76, found 22 of
32 NASA contracts illegal because they were essentially
personal services contracts. Since award of personal
service contracts is therefore not normally accomplished by
United States Government agencies, this study will only
cover nonpersonal service contracts.




"Maintenance service" applies to maintenance and/or
service. Maintenance applies to regular routine maintenance
that is normally performed by public works forces and other
specialized and occasional maintenance work. The subject
of the work is normally the fixed plant or facilities of an
activity. Services apply to those activities normally
supplied by public works forces. Examples serve better than
explanation. Diver services for inspection of underwater
structures, trash collection and disposal, window washing,
snow removal, grounds keeping, and janitorial or custodial
services are typical examples. Reference 21 provides an
extensive example of typical categories of work accomplished
under maintenance service contracts.
The Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR) identify
22 categories of service contracts. The most frequently
encountered types, perhaps because of the high visibility of
performance quality, fall in the general housekeeping area
such as janitorial services, garbage and trash collection,
and grounds maintenance. These housekeeping maintenance
service contracts have traditionally been minimal dollar
value efforts administered at the activity OICC level and
it is this specific area of maintenance service contracting
towards which this work has been directed. Most information
surrounding this narrow segment of contracting, albeit low
in dollar value, has not differed significantly from large
maintenance service contracting efforts and therefore the

technical information covered generally applies to most
other maintenance service contracting. To further specify
a study area, "small" maintenance service contracts (those
under $100,000) will be concentrated on.
B. HISTORY
The origin of military service contracting has been
long forgotten but examples appear in history readings
going back as far as Louis XIV. The United States used
service contracts in our Civil War and in World War I,
including combat operations. Congress did hold hearings
on the subject as early as 1932.
"Modern" concentrated interest started in 1954 when,
in his first budget message to Congress, President Eisenhower
said:
"This budget marks the beginning of a movement
to shift to ... private enterprise Federal
activities which can be more appropriately
and more efficiently carried on that way." [Ref. 15]
This was followed by the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) Bulletin
55-4 to implement the stated policy.
While there was much discussion and little actually
significant action, the commercial establishment, operation,
and maintenance of the Air Force's DEW line was started in
1957. Progress from this beginning has been slow and fraught
with resistance and court battles. Today, with the most up-
to-date Office of Management and Budget (OMB) circular A-7 6
policy guiding implementation, action seems laboriously slow

but the fact is that a growing segment of the military's
services are being performed under contract.
C. MAGNITUDE OF SERVICE CONTRACTING
The Government spent an estimated $20 Billion for
services in 1968 [Ref. 26]. The Army spent about $2.5
billion annually (30% of its procurement monies) on service
contracting as of 1974 [Ref. 33], The Atlantic Division,
Naval Facilities Engineering Command (LANTNAVFACENGCOM)
,
whose area of contracting responsibility is geographically
limited, estimates their total area service contract volume
to be in excess of $12 million annually and the 9 Public
Works Centers spent a total of over $16 million last year.
The point is that maintenance service contracting is not an
insignificant portion of the DOD and certainly NAVFAC
procurement expenditures.
D. AUTHOR'S INTEREST
The author's interest was originally drawn to this
subject as a result of personal experience. Problems
repeatedly were encountered in maintenance service contracting
that consumed personal OICC effort far beyond those expected
from much larger dollar valued construction contracts. It
seemed as though it were often impossible to achieve satis-
factory performance from the contractor, and there was no
effective means to significantly improve the situation.
Higher authority either refused to acknowledge that a problem
10

existed, or minimized the problem because it was low in
dollar value and detailed inspection and administration
was considered an activity responsibility. Additionally
the fact that a janitor failed to clean a ladies lavatory,
for example, certainly didn't seem to impact on the
operational mission capabilities of a unit.
Initial inquiry into the matter indicated that this
was indeed a problem area. Several senior officers indi-
cated disproportionately heavy personal efforts in attempting,
often unsuccessfully, to solve janitorial or grounds main-
tenance problems. The general impression left with the
author was that there simply was no practical way to get
the small maintenance service contractor to perform
satisfactorily.
This work examines small maintenance service contracting
to determine if a problem actually does exist and if so,
how it is being coped with by both those inside and outside
the NAVFAC organization. The goal was to propose thoughts
on possible ways to achieve better performance.
11

II. PROBLEMS IN MAINTENANCE SERVICE CONTRACTS
A. EVIDENCE OF PROBLEMS
There are problems in the service contracting area of
procurement. The recent trends of national policy towards
commercial procurement of services and away from in-house
(or use of Government employees) services have made many
of the previously small problems rather suddenly important.
And the trend continues.
In 1969, performance and administration problems in the
service contracting area prompted ASD level attention and
contracted study [Ref. 18]. Very current research studies,
theses, and new directives are presently available from both
the Army and the Air Force [Refs. 25,31,32,35,36 and 37].
References 32 and 33, for example, reported on and discussed
an extensive analysis of some 347 Army service contract
files. The conclusions and findings were many but weak-
nesses were found in the Army's housekeeping service
contracting [Ref. 33]. Other sources state:
"The Army experiences are inacceptably
large number of problems arising from
its activities with service contracts."
[Ref. 36]
There is further evidence that the Army recognized the
importance of contracted housekeeping services performance
to the "all volunteer" Army concept [Ref. 33]
.

The service contracting industry saw growing problems
in service contracting and the Air Force [Ref. 34] saw
significant problems particularly in the non-performance
area.
Studies conducted in 1970 for both the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the General
Services Administration (GSA) resulted from the poor
cleaning quality they were buying [Ref. 19].
It appears that the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) Circular A-76 which reflects the recent emphasis on
the Government policy of obtaining supplies and services
from the private sector [Ref. 37] is continuing to bring
this area very rapidly to the attention of many federal
agencies. The A-76 policy requires that the Federal Govern-
ment go to commercial sources for work and services where
practical, even though these services are presently being
performed by Government employees.
There was a distinct absence of published Navy research
documentation in the available literature, which gave rise
to several possiblities : 1. there is no such problem in
the Navy, 2. the problem exists but is either not recognized
or not considered worthy of research, or 3. perhaps that
Navy research and reporting is either unpublished or
unavailable.
"HQ USAF O&M Contract Symposium," 12-13 Nov. 74
13

Reference 20 provided some very incisive information
on the NAVFAC situation. LCDR Miles surveyed 20 Navy and
Marine Corps activities and developed a statistical analy-
sis of the ROICC/OICC/PWO perceptions regarding maintenance
service contracting. The data was reduced to an objective
evaluation that was exceptionally comprehensive and repre-
sented a genuine improvement over the subjective analyses
that so often end up becoming the "self-fulfilling prophecy"
interpretation of the researcher.
Generally the Miles study saw NAVFAC maintenance service
contracting as being in a growth pattern in both numbers of
contracts and in dollar value. Interestingly, the perception
of effectiveness of the low bid concept of contractor selec-
tion was roughly split between two groups, one seeing the
concept as effective and one seeing quite the opposite (the
statistical distribution of applicable question responses
appeared bimodal) . Generally it was felt that administra-
tion resources had not kept pace with the above mentioned
growth pattern but that OICC s/ROICC * s/PWO 1 s were generally
satisfied with maintenance service contracting as a means
of accomplishing maintenance service tasks.
References 10, 22 and 23 make it clear that problems
do exist for the Navy and NAVFAC. Several of the personal
interviews generated detailed explanations of causes and
suggested remedies of the problems as perceived. Both the
Atlantic Division and the Western Division, Naval Facilities
Engineering Command recognized contractor performance in
l 4

maintenance service contracting as a particular problem
of growing prominence because of the anticipated continued
growth in maintenance service contracting as directed by
the A-76 Government policy.
While there is an abundance of evidence that problems
exist, analysis resulting in proof of the exact nature of
the problem is difficult to find. Subjective statements
by OICC's/ROICC ' s have merit and will be addressed.
The Heuerman and Candy [Ref. 36] report on the Army
study of 347 service contracts is germane and current and
deserves more than passing comment. The 347 contracts
studied come from 124 procuring activities and the contracts
all exceeded $10,000.
The results are broken down into various branches of
command structure which show some evidence that different
parts of the organizational structure get different results,
have different policies, and consequently had different
opinions. Summations are fairly representative, however,
and those figures cited will be from the overall results.
First, the results indicate that 64 percent of the con-
tract questionnaire response find service contracting to be
more of a problem than supply contracting, 10 percent felt
service contracting less troublesome and 26 percent felt
there was no difference [Ref. 36] . Sixty eight percent of
the responses indicated service contract problems were of
greater magnitude while 9 percent indicated the opposite.
15

Twenty three percent indicated no difference. On house-
keeping along, 73 percent (the highest of all service
contract categories) reported more problems and 6 9 percent
(also the highest) reported the problems of greater magnitude
The study listed the top three problem areas defined
by the questionnaire. For housekeeping they were:
Contract Administration 42%
Lack of Advanced Planning 29%
Inadequate Technical 22%
Specifications
The author's interviews indicated that quality of
performance was the general problem and that it impacted
heavily on contract administration efforts. Further, the
opinions on why performance was deficient varied. The
specifications were found by the Miles Study [Ref. 20] to
be considered very important to performance. LCDR Miles
also found that the provision of increased procedural detail
from the service level would improve performance, in the
opinion of the OICC ' s/ROICC ' s surveyed.
The results of the two studies are not at all divergent
in the author's opinion. Poor performance can lead to
significant administration problems and can often be
significantly improved by better specifications and better
planning.
The often stated OICC/ROICC opinion that maintenance
service contracts are underbid and that upon discovering

this or perhaps by design, planning it, the contractor will
under-perform, is supported by Reference 10. Nor is this
view divergent from the Heuerman-Candy findings. While
the statistical results do not prove the view, they include
it as one of the possibilities.
While the author's resources did not exist to conduct
extensive personal interviews and the questionnaire sampling
procedure was discouraged and made administratively diffi-
cult due to then present Navy regulations covering such
methods, a number of personal interviews were made. The
general impression left with the interviewer was that main-
tenance service contracts often "turned sour" and became
inordinately time consuming to administer. Additionally,
when this did occur, the high visibility and impact on
habitability and sanitation standards made the inevitable
lack of adequate contractor performance very disturbing
to base commanders. The ROICC ' s/OICC ' s/PWO ' s saw themselves
as responsible to a base commander to give him the house-
keeping service but unable to do so because of contractor
non-performance and enforcement difficulties. When main-
tenance service contract value exceeded $100,000 the often
used bond was cited as a reason that the larger contracts
caused less problems.
B. ASPR
The Armed Services Procurement Regulations deal primarily,
as far as maintenance service contracts are concerned, with
17

methods of contracting and do not comprehensively cover
procedural instructions on the actual way to accomplish
the task. Service contracts are spread piecemeal from
Section I to Section XXII.
Section I has paragraphs particularly suited to the
contracting officer including information on buy-ins, award
criteria, options, multi-year service contract limitations
including paragraph 1-322.3 on maintenance and operation
of family housing.
Foreign purchases are covered in Section VI. Section
VI also addresses the Service Contract Act of 1965 which
deals primarily with wages paid to contractor employees.
Section XII is wholly devoted to this McNamara-0 ' Kara
Service Contract Act and provides examples of service
employee contracts.
ASPR Section XIV deals with non-conforming services and
supplies contracts without distinction between the two. It
discusses price reductions, rights of the contractor and
required contracting officer action among other aspects of
non-performance
.
"... recognize the inefficiency of applications
of this portion of ASPR." [Ref. 25]
The above quote typifies the author's reactions to
Section XIV.
Section XV applies to personal service cost principles
ASPR is silent (with the exception of universal use of
18

standard forms 98 and 99) regarding standardized documentation
of service contracts.
ASPR XXII repeatedly goes into the distinction between
a personal and non-personal service contract and does list
examples of service contracts. Section XXII does have some
special provisions for certain types of very specialized
service contracts, not including grounds maintenance and
janitorial services. Reference 25 states that about one
percent of the ASPR pages are devoted to service contracts.
It also points out that:
"Prior to 1974, the ASPR Committee
recognized this problem by stating
that one of the nine probable
improvements might be a separate
coverage for emerging service
contracts." [Ref. 25]
It is also noted that what ASPR does have to say on the
subject is fragmented and thoroughly mixed with supply
contracting, some of which applies and some of which does
not.
C . SUMMARY
The author concludes that ASPR is quite inadequate in
maintenance service contract guidance. A review of the
NAVFAC P-68 contracting manual reveals that it is subject
to many of the same criticisms as ASPR. The fragmentation
of information and lack of specific guidance must impact
on perceived difficulties in contract administration.
19

In summary, problems exist but exactly where the problem
lies is less clear. No statistical study has been made to
evaluate small maintenance service contracting. The form
of and inadequacy of ASPR guidance is part of the problem
and problems with the administration of enforcement
techniques are also troublesome. Good specifications and




In addressing the question of what the actual motiva-
tors of contractor performance are, Mr. Cravens [Ref. 6] put
it most aptly: "What Makes Johnny Contractor Run?"
According to the Armed Services Procurement Regulations
[Ref. 2] (ASPR) : "Profit is the basic motive of business
enterprise." And a NASA publication [Ref. 8] states:
"... to the degree that a contractor can
be motivated by profit to produce more
efficiently, he is achieving the
Government's objectives."
As it appears from the above, indeed a good deal of
the literature [Refs. 3,4,6,12 and 30] supports the profit
maximization motive. The attempt to influence contractor
performance by a correlation with profit or fee through the
actual contract price is the very classical contractual
incentive [Ref. 35] depended on by the Government. Parsons
and Smelser [Ref. 27], however, suggest that organizational
behavior (in this case that of the contractor) is a much
more complex manifestation of individual behavior and, as
such, there are many motivators. Joint-profits, sales
maximization (rather than profit), growth, the "It All
Depends" perspective [Ref. 29] and "Collective Goals" are
just a few of the dimensions studied and reported on by
eminent economists and behavioralists. Men like Drucker,
21

Likert, Baumol, Cyert, March, Katz, Kahn, and Galbraith
to name only a few, all have written on the subject at
length.
Nevertheless, profit maximization is the motive most
generally ascribed to as being strongest. Drucker [Ref. 11]
comments
:
"Production for profit is the principle
of rationality and efficiency on which
the corporation must base itself . .
.
And the demand that some criterion
other than profitability be used as a
determinant of economic actions rest
on a misunderstanding of the nature
of the economic process ..."
Short term examples where contractors dispense with
profit in order to maintain a stable work force and thereby
maintain its capabilities and its market position until
more profitable ventures arise are occasionally seen. But
the pure nature of maintenance service work and particularly
the smaller contracts, limits "filler" or "buy-in" con-
tracting. Janitorial services, for example, are generally
performed by contractors who hire from the local economy
after award. Maintenance services are often performed by
unskilled or semi-skilled workers for which a ready source
of labor is always available.
Keeping in mind that this work is directed towards
small maintenance service contracts in a field dominated
by small businesses and knowing the preponderance of litera-
ture supports the profit motive, one concludes that profit
"makes Johnny Contractor Run."
22

The logical question at this point is: What if, for
some reason (and indeed it happens all too often, be it
error, design, or a change in the economy) a maintenance
service contract were found to yield no profit or perhaps
even generate a loss? This is a very valid question. The
approach that, "that's called business risk and is not the
Government's problem" ignores the facts of maintenance
service contracting life. The primary fact is that profit
is the motivator. The question will be dealt with in other




The Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR)
provide for several different types of contract, each of
which is most advantageous in a particular application and
each governed by specific ASPR references.
A. FIRM FIXED PRICE CONTRACTS
The NAVFAC organization uses formally advertised Firm
Fixed Price (FFP) contracts almost exclusively. For pur-
poses of this discussion negotiated FFP contracts will not
be considered. Contractor selection or the successful
offer is customarily chosen on the basis of the lowest bid
offer. FFP contracts, as they result from formal advertising,
have long been the Congressionally preferred method of pro-
curement. The reason for this preferance of formal adver-
tising is that it is thought that competition will generally
result in less expensive supplies or services. Some of the
literature indicates that in concern for accountability of
public funds it has been considered desirable to minimize
personal judgment in contractor selection and award to
assure honesty on the part of the Government. Considering
that formal advertising uses price as a basis for award,
good specifications, adequate time, and competition are all
required. While the subject of specifications is dealt with
in Chapter V, the importance and difficulty of achieving
24

specifications that explicitly provide the detailed word
picture of requirements against which performance can be
objectively evaluated must be emphasized. Changes to
formally advertised FFP contracts must be negotiated and
the contract provisions formally altered. One disadvantage
to this type contract lies in this often time consuming
process. One Air Force study considers this loss of flexi-
bility to be the major drawback. One author, reflecting
Air Force thinking, reported:
"If procurement is such that bidders will
include contingency costs to allow for
nebulous or indeterminate cost factors,
then the government is penalizing itself
and should look to negotiations to obtain
more flexible pricing." [Ref. 31]
This type of contract (FFP) and the selection criteria
"lowest responsive responsible bidder" applies to nearly
all maintenance service contracts awarded through the
NAVFAC OICC/ROICC system. In fact, NAVFAC directives
[Refs. 21 and 24] authorize only FFP contracts, or firm
unit price contracts. Firm unit price contracts list a
number of estimated quantities. The total award price is
based on the sum of all the unit prices for the stated
estimated quantities. After award, unit prices are used
for contractor payment based on the actual quantities
required. They are actually a variation of the FFP concept,
and while very functional in specific cases, are considered
less desirable than the standard FFP format.
25

The Army uses fixed-price requirements contracts most
heavily [Ref . 36] . These are essentially unit price con-
tracts with delivery time and quantity provisions to fill
needs created by uncertainty in demand. A contractor per-
forms only when a specific demand is laid on him by the
contracting officer and he is then reimbursed based on the
unit price formula.
There appears to be serious doubt regarding appropriate-
ness of requirements contracts as opposed to more conventional
(in the NAVFAC organization) FFP contracts. One of the
suggested reasons for their preference is their alleged use
to overcome funding constraints. Genuinely needed services
which are available under a current requirements contract
are not ordered from a contractor because of a paucity of
funds.
The Air Force literature indicates dominance of other
contract forms. The Air Force Contracting for Operation
& Maintenance Services guide or manual [Ref. 7] for example,
is oriented almost exclusively towards negotiated procurement.
3According to the information available, both NASA and
4GSA have had such difficulties with FFP contracts for
janitorial services that they sought relief in other types
3Personal Interview with Mr. R.B. Stewart, NASA Houston
Manned Space Center, 19 February 1977.
4Personal Interview with Mr. Faulkner, GSA Headquarters,
Washington, D.C., 17 February 1977.
26

of contracts. In explaining the shift, the Government
Executive stated:
"Reason: Their files were filled with
fright stories on what they were
getting under the then-current low
bid system — where a contract carried
'deduct' penalties for non-performance
of services." [Ref. 19]
This was strongly supported in the personal interviews.
B. TWO-STEP CONTRACTS
Two-step formal advertising combines formal advertising
and negotiations and therefore can only be used when speci-
fications are inadequate for, or other conditions otherwise
prevent a formally advertised FFP contract. The first step
evaluates a number of technical proposals with no considera-
tion of price, and the second step is the formal advertising
to only the bidders found technically acceptable in the
first step. Because of the long processing time and the
need for clear specifications and proposal evaluating proce-
dures, this method is normally practical only on large
procurements. It does however provide some incentive for
contractor innovation and can reward unconventional ideas
that might never be considered under a formally advertised
contract. While two-step contracting has been considered
by some of those interviewed, it was ultimately discarded




If the formally advertised contract can be categorized
as a single and separate type of contract, its separate
alternative is the negotiated contract. Of the seventeen
exceptions (or reasons for not using formal advertising)
listed in the ASPR's which give authority for negotiating
a contract, the most widely used has been "... for property
or services for which it is impractical to secure competi-
tion." [Ref. 31] Regardless, the contracting officer must
decide on the applicable exception and thoroughly justify
his position before selecting one of the negotiated
alternatives
.
Negotiated contracts require discussion in an attempt
to reach agreement on contract price and terms. The Govern-
ment considers it contrary to the public interest to
encourage any form of price auctioning and therefore con-
tractor selection precedes the actual "negotiation." Pre-
selection considerations usually involve assurance that the
contractor is responsible, will be responsive and has the
necessary capability and capacity to perform, and while
doing those things can be efficient enough to make the cost
to the government reasonable and commensurable with the
desired end product. The Small Business Act of 1958 also
prescribes negotiation with the Small Business Administration
to secure an award on certain contracts that are set aside




Fixed Price Incentive Contracts
The fixed price incentive (FPI) contract is a
variation of the FFP contract with negotiated incentives.
It is intended to provide the contractor with monetary
incentive to cut costs, improve performance, or expedite
production. Based on a negotiated formula the contractor
and Government share costs above the negotiated target.
The basic drawback to this type contract as seen by the
author is that a fairly definite scope of work and attendant
cost estimate must be made in order to establish the target.
The Air Force seems to have developed an evolutionary
process in using maintenance service contracts at several
locations. The Air Force often initiates an out-of-house
effort (janitorial services might be an example) with a
cost plus type contract and, over a period of years, progress
towards a FFP contract [Ref. 31], depending on FPI contracts
as one of the essential steps. No documentation was found
indicating substantial use or even thorough experimental
use of this approach to contracting by other agencies for
the maintenance service functions. Presumably, if an FPI
type of contract can be written, so too can a FFP type, at
least for most maintenance service functions. Therefore,
since an FPI contract can be written and is the preferred




The least desirable alternative to FFP contracts




cost-plus incentive fee (CPIF) , and cost-plus fixed fee
(CPFF) are types. They are considered more difficult to
administer due to the requirement for periodic performance
evaluations and connected documentation. One of the major
apparent difficulties with cost-plus contracts is that the
Government pays for a contractor's best efforts rather than
a satisfactory performance, such as a "clean facility."
The CPIF contract pays the contractor for costs
and, by predetermined formula similar to the FPIF contract,
distributes a fee. CPFF pays the contractor a predetermined
fee regardless of costs as well as reimbursing him for costs
This type of contract provides little incentive to perform
efficiently. CPAF contracts reward a contractor with a
negotiated fee based on a subjective Government evaluation
of applicable factors such as costs, timeliness, quality,
etc. The Air Force has found that their contractors
generally prefer CPAF contracts [Ref . 31]
.
Other agencies have used some of the cost-plus
contract types extensively. The Air Force's evolutionary
process surfaces repeatedly in their research works and
descriptions leave one with a general feeling of success.
Reference 19 provides a rather dramatic description of
success by the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion (NASA) and the General Services Administration (GSA)
using Incentive Type Contracting (ITC) . ITC is essentially
an adaptation of either the FPI or CPIF types discussed
above, depending on agency and situational choice.
30

Internal GSA memoranda and personal interviews with
GSA officials indicate that GSA has been troubled with an
adverse Comptroller General decision. GSA's determination
and findings (D&F) that:
"... it is impractical to secure competition
because it is impossible to set out adequate
detailed specifications ...,"°
were found unacceptable to the Comptroller General. GSA
has revised its D&F and now intends to continue ITC:
"... in the interests of assuring a fair
proportion of the purchases and contracts
are placed with small business concerns."
[Ref. 14]7
7 8There appears to be a firm legal basis for this D&F. '
GSA's new D&F guidelines [Ref. 14] have been published and
contracts are being awarded [Ref. 13] to small business
concerns based on the above statement and GSA reports by
personal interview that a test case with the new GSA D&F
system is expected and will determine their long term course
of action regarding use of incentive type contracts.
5Comptroller Feneral Decision B-184186, 3 February ]976.
Personal Interview with Mr. Faulkner, GSA Headquarters,
Washington, D.C., 17 February 1977.
7Authority covered in Federal Procurement Regulation
(FPR) 1-3.201 and 1-1. 706-5 (b)
.




In summary, while NAVFAC uses only FFP contracts
for maintenance service, other agencies have found that
method fraught with problems and are attempting various
forms of negotiated contract with differing degrees of
success.
Personal interviews at the Public Works Center (PWC)
and Engineering Field Division (EFD) level indicate that
NAVFAC is inflexible in its policy regarding FFP contracts
for maintenance service, and successes or innovations in
other contract types by other agencies are unlikely to alter
that policy until a new type becomes extremely well estab-
lished and accepted. It appears that the greatest hurdle
lies in providing adequate justification to support use of
one of the seventeen exceptions that permit negotiating a
contract rather than formally advertising it. If negotiation
could be justified, however, contracting officers should
be able to select the contract type that best suits their
(the Government's, as well) needs.
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V. PRE-AWARD CONTRACT CONSIDERATIONS
The actions and decisions to be made prior to award are
many and a complete discussion of all could involve volumes.
Instead, this chapter will discuss a number of contract
provisions or types that can, in the correct environment,
affect performance and resulting satisfaction.
From an activity Commanding Officer's point of view
there are three basic prerequisites to entering into a
maintenance service contractual agreement: development of
a well defined concise specification; execution of the actual
contract documents; and the administration and inspection
of contractor performance. To ignore one or overemphasize
one at another's expense inevitably will result in less than
satisfactory results [Ref . 17] . Each prerequisite must be
properly performed by adequate numbers of properly trained
people if positive results are to be realized. Of the
three, the specifications will be discussed in this chapter.
A. SPECIFICATIONS
Specifications for small maintenance service contracts
are normally the responsibility of the Public Works Officer
(PWO)
. Their importance can not be overemphasized. They
become part of the contract and when found to be in error
or leave the reader in any doubt, the courts customarily
rule against the drafter.
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"Errors in specifications are compensable
changes, since the Government warrants that
if its specifications are followed a satis-
factory product will result. Similarly,
since the Government has furnished the
specifications, any ambiguities therein
will follow the reasonable construction
placed upon them by the contractor and
will be construed against the Government."
[Ref. 28]
Those who write specifications must have the experience
and technical knowledge to translate requirements into a
clear unambiguous statement of work that will get the job
done while protecting the Governments interests.
Many situations indicate that the required contract
award time is nearly twice as great for service contracts
as it is on supply contracts [Ref. 36]. The reason often
lies in difficulty defining the scope of work and agreeing
on the desired specifications. In an attempt to streamline
and improve specifications that the Army and the Air Force
are working on, standardization of specifications is an
immediate goal. The Army and Air Force have found that
performance standards for maintenance service contracts,
particularly housekeeping functions, are "highly subjective."
Requirements such as,
"to meet the standards required by this
specification, a swept floor shall show
no streaks or missed deposits of dust and
corners shall be clean," and
"dusting will be accomplished to keep
all surfaces free of dust," [Ref. 32]
34

identify the difficulty of discerning any resemblance to
an objective reasonable standard in many of the specifications
Reference 19 lays the groundwork for the development
of standard guide specifications for base operations and
maintenance contracts in the Air Force which should make
specification writing more efficient and less time consuming.
Interestingly, Reference 34 recommends against service con-
tract specification standardization in the Air Force primarily
due to the loss of flexibility which would result [Ref. 34].
The Army is drafting a manual to assist housekeeping contract
administrators [Ref. 37]. Much effort is also going into
a current Army program to standardize maintenance service
specifications and generally improve contract administration
through the use of standard inspection checklists, defini-
9tions, alternatives, reporting formats etc.
It is evidently NAVFAC ' s intent to utilize or at least
evaluate for the purpose of using, the portions of the
Army's effort. In fact, personal interviews and citings
by this author, of personal memoranda that circulate between
NAVFAC Headquarters and the EFD's and Public Works Centers
(PWC's) indicate that specifications are considered one of
the main problems and effort is to be directed thereto.
9Department of the Army Construction Engineering
Research laboratory schedule identified in CERL memo
CELL-FOR, 4 November 1976.




B. CONTRACTOR SITE VISITS
Site visits and familiarity with the contract provisions
are essential for a contractor to properly evaluate the
scope and cost to perform. An Army study cites a trash
disposal case where a successful offeror did not comprehend
the impact on price of the location of the sanitary fill.
He had not made a site visit and was subsequently seeking
relief in an attempt to avoid bankruptcy [Ref. 36]. Another
documented case was described where a janitorial contractor
bid lower than the previous annual contract, unaware that
a wing had been added to the structure and the contract
scope. While the government does have the responsibility
to point out obvious bidding errors, small contractors
continue to jeopardize themselves by improper bid preparation
Interviews have very dramatically supported this observation.
ASPR 2-201 (a) and 3-501 (a) (3) cover site visits and
legally protects the Government but:
"little solace is gained if the successful
offeror failed to consider work conditions
in his price and is performing unsatisfac-
torily, or not at all, to avoid financial
loss. Many contractors performing services
especially housekeeping services, are small
business firms and a financial loss is
tantamount to bankruptcy." [Ref. 36]
Heuerman and Candy [Ref. 36] suggest that virtually
mandatory site visits would solve the problem. This may
be true but as a practical matter, the probability that
such a requirement would become acceptable in NAVFAC
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administered firm fixed price contracts appears extremely-
remote. The realities of service contracting being as they
are the more usable suggestion would seem to fall back into
the specification area. Clear concise specifications that
draw an exact word picture would obviate or minimize the
need for mandatory site visits. Nevertheless, perfection
is rare and clear specifications to one may confuse another,
so this author recommends emphasis on clarity and simplicity
in specifications writing.
C. SMALL BUSINESS ACT SECTION 8A CONTRACTS
The use of Small Business Administration (SBA) section
8A contracts has been suggested. Section 8A grants the SBA
the authority to enter into contracts with other government
agencies. The SBA objective is to assist small business
concerns owned and controlled by socially or economically
disadvantaged persons to achieve a competitive position in
the market place [Ref. 16]. Often the contracting officer
actually negotiates a contract with the contractor while the
SBA plays only a monitoring role.
With a detailed negotiation, an adequate level of effort
can be assured and a contractor management plan can be
perused prior to award. Reference 3 points out that some
areas may not have SBA facilities or the SBA office nearest
may not have sufficient resources to adequately perform the
necessary advisory and assistance functions for the contrac-
tor. A new 8A contractor adrift in the morass of contractual
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"bureaucratese" and without really efficient resources to
perform because of lack of SBA attention is detrimental to
all concerned. The 8A contracts may result in good perfor-
mance as one Navy interview pointed out or it may fail as
has been reported in other interviews. It would seem that
only the contracting officer who has local experience with
the SBA can judge and make that decision. A well staffed
SBA office with a reasonable track record with the contracting
office has the capability of giving the Government good
performance at a reasonable cost. Reasonable cost is
emphasized, for an 8A contract is not competitively bid and
may not produce the lowest price contract. As Reference 31
(only one example of several similar comments) pointed out,
the customer or activity is willing to pay a fair and reason-
able price including reasonable profit to the contractor,
provided it gets the specified performance.
It is recommended that SBA 8A contracts be considered
as a viable contractor selection alternative where the
probability of adequate SBA support is high. An 8A con-
tract is, after all, a negotiated one and as such perfor-
mance incentives may be thoroughly discussed with the
contractor.
Personal Interview with CDR. J.C. Dobler, PWC San
Diego, 18 February 1977.
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D. CONSOLIDATION BY WORK TYPE
Consolidation of contracts of a specific work type
is another possible way to get per :e. In the San
12Diego area a number of janitorial contracts at dirrerent
activities were consolidated into a single large contract.
Because of the larger size, a performance bond was required
and larger contractors were attracted. Generally, larger
contractors have better management plans and bid estimating
procedures. In the San Diego situation, one consolidation
of contract bv work type has succeeded. Additionally, one
contract is significantly more easily administered than
several smaller contracts.
This solution is considered very practical and usable
but it must be remembered that it is an alternative to the
small contract rather than a remedy to problems associated
with size. It may be, however, a remedy :c performance




Multi-function contracts are another possibility for
improving performance. In 1973 the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) proposed contracting all support functions
at 70 CONUS Air Force bases and proposed that all public
12Personal Interview with Mrs. ?. Mancuso, Public
Works Center, San Diego, 18 February 1977.
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works functions at any single base be awarded under a
single contract [Ref. 34]. The Air Force found that
change-over and start-up functions are much more difficult
with multi-function contracts. Small businesses are less
able to compete, "home-town" management and labor forces
are less likely and the pure size of the award may reduce
competition to some degree.
There are some advantages to multi-function contracts
as well. Such contracts are, in theory and probably in
fact, cheaper than the total of several single-function
contracts to accomplish the same total job. There is
little doubt that there will be less government overhead and
administrative expense. It is obviously cheaper to prepare
and award one contract than several. The Air Force has
found that a contractor will accept lower profit percen-
tages of the award price if the total dollar profits are
sufficiently attractive [Ref. 34].
The integration of placement of responsibility is
another advantage. One contractor is less able to fault
another or the government if he is responsible for all
functions. From a contract administrator's point of view
it would be much easier to present needs and problems to
a single contractor's representative and hold that individual




There are advantages and disadvantages to this approach.
Multi-function contracts, like consolidation by type of
work, has the effect of eliminating the small maintenance
service contract and contractor and thereby eliminating the
peculiar problems associated with small size. The general
problem of performance is likely to remain but to a presumably
lesser degree.
F. MINIMUM LEVEL OF EFFORT CLAUSE
Another method to improve performance is to make a mini-
mum level of effort a part of the contract provisions. A
contract provision [Ref. 39] of this type has been success-
fully used in maintenance service contracting.
"The contractor shall furnish sufficient
personnel to promptly accomplish all work
specified herein as deemed necessary by
the Contracting Officer. For ... (specific
structures) . .
.
, such personnel shall
consist of a minimum , of the number and
classifications given below, all working
a complete eight hour shift:
NUMBER SHIFT CLASSIFICATION
5 Monday through Janitor, Cleaner
Friday 0730-1600
2 Sunday through Janitor, Cleaner
Saturday 2200-0630
2 Saturday and Janitor, Cleaner
Sunday 0730-1600
The contractor shall ensure that proper and
adequate supervision, as provided herein,
is available to properly manage the work




The contractor shall employ at no additional
cost to the Government such additional per-
sonnel as may at any time be required to
accomplish on schedule all work specified
herein. ..." [Ref. 39]
This clause clearly may not be construed as making the
contract a personal-services contract. It's use requires
a thorough detailed estimate by experienced estimators and
provides a minimum level of effort. The criticism rises
that the clause usurps the management functions to the extent
that innovative approaches to management would be stifled.
One must keep in mind that its use is rather limited to
contracts similar to janitorial service contracts that are
labor intensive and in which the scope of work is very well
defined. Put another way, it applies where management
innovation is most limited.
The clause has been reviewed by legal counsel and is
considered legal. It has the great attribute of preventing
a contractor from undermanning a task for any reason,
particularly because he may have underbid the job. It does
not guarantee performance but it does provide for sufficient
resources to provide performance. One of the criticisms
of this clause is that some consider it not very "inspectable.
"
For example, construction job inspection procedures require
recording labor hours. The requirement for payroll state-
ments would be helpful however and is recommended. The
question would only become critical in non-performance cases
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which would traditionally draw more intense inspection
and documentation. The clause appears useful.
G. THE PRE-AWARD SURVEY
The pre-award survey is another "protector" of the
Government interests. Defense Contract Administration
Service (DCAS) offices will inspect a potential successful
bidder to assist in the determination of contractor respon-
sibility, both technically and financially. This is a
costly process. The San Diego DCASR (R indicates region)
indicates that on the average, a single pre-award survey
will cost the Government a minimum of $1000. Situations
have been recorded where the pre-award survey/SBA certifi-
cate of competency offer proceeded through ten bidders
before selection of a responsible contractor. Besides the
$10,000 DCAS expenses to survey the ten bidders and the
contracting office's administrative expenses, the process
required six months. Three change orders extending the
expiring contract were needed to prevent a break in the
essential service. Were the contract award in the amount
of $100,000, administrative expenses before award would
easily constitute 15 percent or more of the contract value.
Of course, the above described situation [Ref. 40] is
the exception to the rule but it points out the costs of
processing non-responsible bidder's offers. It has been
suggested that the requirement for bonds would automatically
weed out the bidders which haven't the resources to perform.
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This is true to a great extent but does contravene present
procurement policy.
DCAS pre-award surveys to determine responsibility are
another filter which helps secure performing contractors
but by no means guarantees performance. ASPR prohibits
use of bonding to determine responsiblity . The coincidence
of bonded contractors being found responsible in pre-award
surveys relative to non-bonded contractors leads to the
question: can bonding be used to insure post-award perfor-
mance while it improves bidder responsibility as well? The
two seem undeniably connected.
Combining the performance assurance with the sorting
out of non-responsible bidders presents a strong case in
favor of bond requirements. In any case DCAS pre-award
surveys are felt to be useful and necessary and, in the
author's opinion, should be consistently used.
H. RENEWAL OPTIONS
The use of renewal options has also been considered
as a performance incentive for the contractor. Under this
provision the government has the option to renew the con-
tract with the same contractor for an additional period,
usually one year.
It is thought that this provision would generate good
performance especially during the first year, even though
contractor profit might be minimal. The contractor would,
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in theory, strive to influence the Government in this way
to exercise its option for an annual renewal.
Underwood, in comparing a multi-year option with actual
multi-year contracts used overseas, states:
"... options and the AFLC Three-Year
Policy may be used to partially achieve
the effect of multi-year contracts. ...
their use is less effective, less
efficient and less desirable." [Ref. 34]
ASPR 1-322 limits multi-year service contracts to pri-
marily overseas applications so, for CONUS maintenance
service contracts, the question is somewhat academic. The
fact remains that the option clause is probably more con-
ducive to good performance than a straight one year con-
tract but probably less usable than the multi-year type
contract.
It is the author's conclusion based primarily on inter-
views that the option clause can be a useful tool to assure
performance.
I . SUMMARY
In summary, there are a number of specific decisions
to be made before award that can influence performance
significantly, as follows.
SBA 8A contracts (where practical)
Consolidation by Type
Multi-function contracts





Each can help, some only in very specific and highly
limited applications and locations. None is a panacea,
however, and performance is not assured through their
use. The probability of good performance can nevertheless





VI. GOVERNMENT POST-AWARD ENFORCEMENT TECHNIQUES
From the activity Commanding Officer's (CO.) point
of view, funds are provided to the contracting officer who
is expected to procure a service through commercial sources
The CO., having paid the price, can and does expect
performance.
Maintenance service contracts provide services which
are acutely visible to a CO. and, for that matter, to the
public and the C.O.'s superiors. Poorly kept grounds and
dirty or unsanitary facilities can and have been used as
judgment criteria in evaluating a C.O.'s effectiveness.
The result is acute command interest in maintenance ser-
vice matters, at least as far as visible performance is
concerned.
From the contracting officer's point of view, as well,
performance is the critical issue and the desired goal, be
that goal clean buildings, well kept grounds, or any of the
many services procured. The contracting officer is charged
with securing performance yet he is very confined in what
and how he may do so, largely by statutory requirement.
Yet, for all the interest, performance continues to be the
major problem in maintenance service contracting.
Reference 10 makes some interesting observations borne
out in the interviews made during the course of this work:
47

"Because of the intense competition in the
field, bids are always less than the Govern-
ment estimate, and the low bid is substan-
tially below the Government estimate. ...
The low bidder normally does not include
sufficient productive labor or supervisory
effort in his bid to permit him to perform
in accordance with specification... Upon
award of a contract, the contractor deter-
mines the amount of productive labor he can
employ on the job within his total bid price
(considering overhead and profit) , and this
becomes an effective ceiling for the duration
of the contract."
One interview revealed a situation where the contractor,
even though the Government strongly suggested a "changed
conditions" change order, refused to increase his level of
effort beyond that average labor ceiling which his award
price permitted, exclusive of the change order. In short,
the contractors often end up providing a level of effort
rather than performance. If that level of effort does not
coincidentally provide the minimum performance acceptable,
the Government must demand performance and, if not forth-
coming, proceed with default. Air Force and Army observa-
tions of contractors who stay only a step ahead of default
are testimony of the inspection, documentation and adminis-
trative efforts the Government goes through to secure good
performance while often achieving only marginal performance.
A. INSPECTION
One of the first considerations of the post-award era
is inspection. Inspection is the monitoring of contractor
performance and comparison with the specification. Good
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inspection is dependent on a host of variables such as
numbers and skill levels of inspectors, applicability of
performance standards, quality of the contractor, etc.
In the NAVFAC maintenance service contract procedure,
although the contracting officer derives his authority from
and is responsible (contractually speaking) to NAVFAC, the
inspectors are paid and provided by the activity. The
Miles study [Ref. 20] indicates that the OICC's/ROICC's
feel that inspection manning and training have not kept pace
with the progressive increase in both dollar value and num-
bers of contracts. Personal interviews support this. The
rapid growth in maintenance service contracting as a result
of the A-76 stated Government policy has not permitted the
necessary long term training and experience to keep pace
with change.
As Heuerman and Candy [Ref. 36] state:
"... an integral part of the specifications
should be the 'performance standards' for
determining that the requirements specified
in the statement of work have been met."
Performance standards should serve as inspection and accept-
ance criteria for the inspector. Maintenance service con-
tract performance standards have historically been very
subjective and very subject to the individual interpretation
of both the Government inspectors and the contractors [Ref. 36]
The Army study [Ref. 36] suggests that documentation
requirements of non-performance often results in 100 percent
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inspection of the contracted services. It proposes statis-
tical sampling techniques and formal contractor quality
assurance techniques as a major step towards resolving some
of the many maintenance service contract problems. One
ROICC interviewed had one burdensome janitorial contract
that, though the value was only $20,000 had consumed easily
half that much in inspection and administration costs in
the course of the one year contract life. So it would
seem that if the contractor selection process, regardless
of what that process is, provides a conscientious contractor
who is making a reasonable profit, inspection and adminis-
tration costs can be minimal. Conversely an inexperienced
or lackadaisical contractor can make administration and
inspection so costly in terms of effort that in-house
service might represent a significant saving.
Nevertheless, the tendency is to inspect more heavily
in order to document non-performance so that positive action
may be taken with the contractor to improve the situation.
It would appear that firmer, more objective performance
standards would simplify documentation of such cases. But
so too would financially sound, efficiently managed, con-
scientious contractors, for non-performance would occur
less frequently and be easier to correct.
The continuous surveillance of performance requires
skilled personnel who can apply enough time to actual
inspection to quickly identify performance deficiencies.

Failure to take prompt corrective action establishes a
low performance precedent resulting in long term run-down
of base cleanliness in the case of janitorial services for
example, which may require unreasonable recovery effort.
This compounds the fact that public funds are being spent
for services not being rendered and contributes to con-
tractor profit at that public's expense.
Heuerman and Candy also comment on the human nature
realities of the profit incentive to not perform:
"It is a natural inclination of contractors,
even those with the highest degree of
integrity, to perform only the minimum
acceptable amount of work, when minimizing
the level of performance increases con-
tractor profits." [Ref. 36]
So it appears that good inspection becomes dependent
on the pre-award matters of adequate numbers of well trained
inspection staff, explicit unambiguous specifications with
applicable performance standards, and selection of a good
and responsible contractor. Inspection and the resulting
documentation remains the only proof of non-performance.
It must be properly done if the other post-award techniques
can be applied as described hereinafter.
B. PRICE REDUCTION FOR NON-PERFORMANCE
The Government has generated a number of insurance pro-
visions to assure performance after award. They are usually
negative motivators and the probability or unspoken threat
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of their use constitutes one of the risks a contractor
must face.
One of the negative motivators is price reduction for
non-performance of some specific task. In NAVFAC contracting,
discovery of non-performance or inadequate performance must
normally be reported to the contractor in writing and he
must be given an adequate amount of time to correct the
deficiency. When failure to correct a deficiency within
the specified time occurs, the government may deduct money
from the normal amount due the contractor for the period.
There are other times and procedures available but the point
that the government may deduct pay for non or poor perfor-
mance is a commonly used negative motivator.
The effectiveness of this provision has been thoroughly
examined by several research works and most of the literature
discredits its usefulness, as sampled below.
"Generally, price reduction provisions as
presently employed are not effective in
motivating contractors to perform services
satisfactorily." [Ref. 36]
"... one custodial services contract con-
tained a price reduction, by formula, of
$500 for failure to clean windows. Although
the contractor was paid on the basis of a
blanket price for cleaning the facility,
contract file data revealed the contractor
bid price included subcontracting the window
cleaning at a price of $1500. When the
windows were not cleaned, the contractor's
invoice was reduced by $500 so that the




One must add that there really was no alternative way of
getting clean windows. References 4 and 7 also include
other examples where payment reductions do not match costs.
The author's personal experience is that contractors awarded
firm fixed price contracts manipulate the required schedule
of prices to match their own performance intentions or
estimate. If reductions in pay correspond to the dispro-
portionate figures, situations similar to the window washing
example will occur. Contract administrators have little
genuine power to require change of the price schedule and
administration resources in both the forms of man-hours and
expertise are often insufficient to carry out the detailed
perusal required to discover these subtleties.
The theme that the activity desires performance rather
than reimbursement dominated both the researched studies
and interviews. The contracting officer is bound by a
reasonable deduction for non or poor performance since
Government policy really does not permit administrative
use of this clause as a costly penalty. So the contractor
simply doesn't get paid for something he hasn't done and
since he didn't expend resources, it harms him little if
at all. On the other hand, the activity simply did not
get a necessary service.
The conclusion that this really is not an effective
motivator to influence contractor performance appears
valid. In fact, invoking the clause may be in the
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contractor's interest as in the case of the rather extreme
window washing example. Making the price reduction punitive
would accomplish the motivation but, in a practical sense,
is not likely to be usable in the present federal contracting
climate. To eliminate the clause seems unlikely as well,
for it is a step short of termination of the contract which
has the potential of matching work performed with price
paid. Its very limited value appears to lie in this weak
matching to prevent or reduce "nothing for something" and
provide some protection of public funds. It has little
value in influencing the contractor to perform.
C. DEFAULT AND BONDING
The threat of termination for default is another nega-
tive incentive. One must realize that a default does not
constitute debarment so default actually only applies to
the single contract in question. If a contractor finds
himself in a situation where his profit is negligible or
he is actually losing money, default may be in his own
best interests.
Maintenance service contracts valued under $100,000
will normally not call for bonding of the contractor nor
is bonding, in most cases, permitted. The probability of
default then has little impact on the contractors ability
to subsequently become bonded. A bonded contract that is
defaulted becomes the responsibility of the bonding company.
This is very costly to bonding companies and it is most
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unlikely that the defaulting contractor would be permitted
bond again by any bonding company before subsequent proof
of performance capability. The threat of loss of all
bonded contracting work can be a serious concern for any
profit motivated company.
If there is no bond to insure performance and the
contractor is in a loss or no profit situation he may
welcome termination even though it is for default. One
difficulty is that, should the contractor choose to contest
the termination as being "at the convenience of the govern-
ment," rather than "default," a significant break in service
can result. Imagine no janitorial service, no trash pick-up,
or no grounds maintenance for several months while the
question is litigated.
To compound the difficulty, there exists the tremendous
cost involved with processing a claim through the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) . Should the
Government simply pay off or negotiate a settlement of
a $15,000 claim, for example, or should it fight it out to
the bitter end? Informal interviews over a long period
of time lead to the conclusion that small claims will be
settled before reaching the ASBCA as a matter of policy.
Regardless, there is a termination clause and, when
exercised, the activity must find alternative ways to
perform the service while the default claims are being
processed. Even the procedure of immediately advertising
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for a new contract takes so much time that the break in
service often constitutes a genuine burden to the activity
As Lt. Col. Underwood put it:
"... after there is no real alternative
to exercise the default provisions of
the contract. When an entire function,
... are (is) performed by a single
contractor, default is not very attrac-
tive to the installation commander.
The disruption in services which would
result and the delay in reprocurement
creates strong pressure to live with
poor or incomplete performance. Some-
times, such performance must be endured
for long periods of time, until the
contractor, on his own initiative or
with Air Force assistance, is able to
correct the performance deficiencies
[Ref. 34]."
The performance bond appears to be a powerful incentive
which gives the contractor a strong reason to avoid ter-
mination for default. The formal NAVFAC policy [Ref. 5]
is to prohibit bonding of maintenance service contracts of
less than $100,000 or contracts awarded pursuant to section
8A of the Small Business Act. The Air Force and Army
bonding policies vary as do policies of other federal
agencies. Personal interviews at the EFD and PWC levels
indicate that the NAVFAC policy has been informally
softened to permit bonding upon readvertisement in specific
bases, "where problems have arisen on a prior maintenance
job and performance has been unsatisfactory," by making a
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written well justified determination to that effect.
13This has been effectively used.
With performance bonding goes payment bonding. Payment
bonds guarantee the employee payment of employee wages.
PWC, San Diego has recorded several cases where contractors
(both bonded and non-bonded) have not met payrolls. Payment
bonded contracts relieve the embarassment to the government
and difficulty experienced by the U.S. Department of Labor
in trying to provide justice to the wronged employees of
a failing contractor.
According to the Surety Association of America, bonds
of the performance/payment type cost about $5 per $1000
of bond. Generally, activity Commanding Officers indicate
a willingness to expend the minimal extra funds for the
insurance a bond provides. It appears that the reason for
the bonding limit is that many small companies find diffi-
culty in getting bonded or are unable to get bonded because
of lack of prime contracting experience. One might ask if
it is in the public interest for NAVFAC to be dealing with
these businessmen or conversely, how is a small entrepreneur
ever to become bondable without experience. The records
show that bonding doesn't eliminate problems but it does
tend to sort out the contractors who are non-bondable, some
Personal Interview with Mrs. P. Mancuso, Public
Works Center, San Diego, 18 February 1977.
57

by reason of previous difficulties that cause the bonding
companies to avoid the risk and some through lack of
resources or experience.
Default and bonding are closely related issues. The
conclusion that threat of default is not a significant
performance stimulant in small maintenance service contracts
is traceable to the absence of any bonding requirement.
D. SUMMARY
In summary, the standard post award enforcement tech-
niques presently used in NAVFAC administered small mainten-
ance service contracts are ineffective. One key to making
them more effective lies, in this authors view, in a more
liberal requirement for performance/payment bonding. A
second would be punitive price reduction for non-performance
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Service contracts are more troublesome than other types
of contracts and the problems are generally more difficult
and resource consuming to resolve. The small contracts
are no exception and, probably due to the lack of or
ineffectiveness of enforcement techniques, the NAVFAC OICC
or ROICC administered maintenance service contracts cause
more problems that are still more resource consuming to
resolve than larger service contracts.
The problem of non-performance is the manifestation of
several probable root causes:
a. Under-bidding due to error or design with under-
performance being the only alternative open to
the contractor after award.
b. The natural tendency of contractors to want to
maximize profit. With contractor costs being
nearly all labor, reduction of that cost through
under-manning is logical, provided the Government
will tolerate same.
The Government, NAVFAC OICC's/ROICC's specifically, have a
number of pre-award decisions that may improve performance,
as follows:
a. Specifications — standardization, as the Army is
doing, should improve the situation and objective
performance standards need to be developed.

b. Site visits — it is unlikely that they can be
required even though such contractor pre-bid
homework would improve bid quality. Clarity in
specification writing would help to overcome the
absence of contractor site visits.
c. SBA 8A contracts — these contracts can work well
if SBA resources and interest permit adequate
contractor support. The contractor's management
plan and manning levels are negotiable. The local
conditions and the SBA 8A performance record vary
so much that the decision must be made by the
local OICC/ROICC.
d. Consolidation by type or multi-function contracts
would probably improve performance by virtue of
making the contract large. Larger, more experienced,
more financially sound firms would be attracted.
e. The renewal option — evidence that this option
works is inconclusive, but it appears to act as
a positive performance motivator. It's use is
recommended.
The available post-award enforcement techniques are as
follows
:
a. Inspection — again, this often depends on the quality
of the specifications and the objectivity of the
performance standards. Over-inspection is undesirable
but unavoidable in many circumstances where
performance is a problem. Statistical sampling
should be explored.

b. Price reduction for non-performance is ineffective
as a motivator- It does not give the Government
performance. It cannot be eliminated but it should
not be expected to motivate performance. In the
unlikely event that the price reduction could be
made punitive, this conclusion might be quite
different.
c. Threat of default is considered ineffective in
small contracts where no performance bonding is
involved. If a bonding requirement were made a
part of the contract, this action would be more
effective.
d. Performance bonding is not used in small (under
$100,000) maintenance service contracting. Such
use would improve performance.
As things now stand, there does not appear to be any
truly effective performance enforcement techniques for
small maintenance service contracts.
Other agencies effectively use various contract types
with success. The GSA incentive type contract (ITC) seems
a viable alternative that works. Although controversial,
it should be studied by the Navy to determine applicability
to Navy contracts.
Other specific recommendations which have resulted from
this study include the following:




b. ASPR guidance on service contracting should be
consolidated and direction should be more tailored
to service vis-a-vis supply contracting. Standard
forms should be developed and included.
c. More liberal use of bonding would provide a more
conscientious and well prepared spread of contractors
d. NAVFAC should develop a maintenance service con-
tracting manual which would include standard
specifications and would be directed at problem
solving.
e. A thorough historical analysis on a contract by
contract basis should be made of NAVFAC administered
maintenance service contracts to review common
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